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INTRODUCTION 
An Illinois resident voting for her US senator no doubt ex-
pects that other residents of Illinois also have the same oppor-
tunity to cast votes in the election for that office. She probably 
also assumes that other Illinois residents would have the same 
stake in the outcome and the same opportunity to vote. But she 
likely does not expect residents of Michigan or Ohio to cast their 
own votes in that Illinois election. Similarly, a Chicago school dis-
trict resident most likely assumes that other residents of the 
school district can vote in elections for that school board’s mem-
bers. If, however, St. Louis or Cleveland school district residents 
were to cast votes in the Chicago election, that Chicago resident 
would likely have grave concerns. 
While these are extreme examples, certain voters across the 
country do in fact face situations in which the voting systems uti-
lized in their communities allow nonresidents of a jurisdiction to 
vote in that jurisdiction’s elections. This can occur when state leg-
islation is implemented in a locality with unique or overlapping 
boundaries,1 or when certain communities allow nonresident 
property owners to vote in local elections.2 These residents may 
claim that such voting schemes unconstitutionally dilute the im-
pact of their votes in their jurisdiction’s elections.3 The Supreme 
Court has proclaimed that the right to vote commands protection 
from this kind of dilution, noting that “[t]here is more to the right 
 
 † BA 2010, New York University; JD Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago 
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 1 See, for example, Locklear v North Carolina State Board of Elections, 514 F2d 
1152, 1153–54 & n 4 (4th Cir 1975) (explaining how state legislation creating school board 
elections was implemented in one county such that nonresidents of the rural county school 
district could vote for some of that district’s board members). 
 2 See, for example, May v Town of Mountain Village, 132 F3d 576, 578–79 (10th Cir 
1997) (describing how the town’s charter extended the franchise to both residents and 
nonresident owners of real property located within the town). 
 3 See, for example, Locklear, 514 F2d at 1153. See also Part II. 
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to vote than the right to mark a piece of paper and drop it in a 
box. . . . It also includes the right to have the vote counted at full 
value without dilution or discount.”4 
This Comment explores the ways in which courts address 
these nonresident vote dilution claims. Nonresident vote dilution 
claims are framed as equal protection challenges; resident plain-
tiffs claim that when nonresidents have the right to vote, resi-
dents’ votes have less weight in violation of the Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause and Supreme Court precedent.5 Although 
several appellate courts have grappled with these claims, they have 
remained largely unexplored in the legal literature.6 
Two important threshold issues exist here. The first question 
is whether a nonresident vote dilution claim can be raised at all 
in the absence of an objective standard against which to measure 
it. The second threshold issue, always implicated by any cognizable 
equal protection claim, is the level of review that courts should 
use to assess the challenged law’s constitutionality. Government 
actions that potentially violate the Constitution’s Equal Protection 
Clause are largely reviewed using either the more deferential ra-
tional basis standard or the more robust strict scrutiny standard, 
with some discrete claims receiving intermediate scrutiny.7 In in-
dividual voting rights cases, a balancing test has developed: 
courts decide how much scrutiny to use when reviewing a chal-
lenged scheme after balancing the burden it places on an individ-
ual’s right and the countervailing state interest used to justify it.8 
Nonresident vote dilution claims present unique issues for 
this framework, as vote dilution is often framed as an aggregate, 
rather than an individual, burden.9 This balancing test can there-
fore be an uncomfortable fit for allegedly dilutive practices, and 
 
 4 Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 555 n 29 (1964). 
 5 See, for example, May, 132 F3d at 577, 580. 
 6 For some exceptions, see Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One 
Vote and Local Governments, 60 U Chi L Rev 339, 396–401 (1993) (discussing nonresident 
vote dilution cases within the larger context of election law’s application to local govern-
ments); Gerald L. Neuman, “We Are the People”: Alien Suffrage in German and American 
Perspective, 13 Mich J Intl L 259, 317–22 (1992) (discussing nonresident vote dilution 
cases in a larger discussion of the construction of political boundaries); Note, State Re-
strictions on Municipal Elections: An Equal Protection Analysis, 93 Harv L Rev 1491, 
1498–1501, 1507–08 (1980) (discussing the equal protection ramifications of nonresident 
vote dilution cases and advocating for a reduced focus on the level of constitutional review 
in this sphere). 
 7 See Part I.D.1. Intermediate scrutiny is generally reserved for claims of gender 
discrimination. See text accompanying notes 86–88. 
 8 See Part I.D.2. 
 9 See notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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the tiers of scrutiny used in earlier cases remain important for 
considering such claims. The constitutional review used by a 
court matters: Heightened scrutiny in all instances would likely 
lead to disenfranchisement of nonresidents because this standard 
is often considered “fatal in fact.”10 If more deferential rational 
basis review were used instead, these voting schemes would likely 
be left in place.11 
Currently, circuits are in discord as to the appropriate stan-
dard of review for these claims, and the Supreme Court has not 
provided any guidance on the issue. The Fourth Circuit applies 
strict scrutiny in the nonresident vote dilution context.12 Most 
other circuits, however, use a form of rational basis review that 
specifically measures rationality by the “substantial interest” 
that nonresidents have in the relevant election; if no substantial 
interest exists, the nonresident enfranchisement is considered 
irrational.13 This Comment attempts to resolve that split. 
Part I first explores the general background of the “one per-
son, one vote” principle against vote dilution and its application 
by the Supreme Court. It then considers the traditional frame-
work used to review claims that government actions violate the 
Equal Protection Clause and how that framework has been ap-
plied in the specific context of election regulations. Part II sets out 
the circuits’ approaches to the review of nonresident vote dilution 
claims. Part III attempts to resolve the existing split in authority: 
it reframes the issues at stake and considers them in tandem with 
similar claims of nonresident disenfranchisement. This final Part 
argues that, without a proper benchmark against which to mea-
sure these nonresident vote dilution claims, decisions about en-
franchisement in this arena should be left to the legislature. It 
then argues that, if courts do reach the merits of these claims, 
rational basis review aligns with the voting rights framework 
that the Supreme Court has established in other contexts. It also 
resolves an inherent tension in the form of rational basis review 
that most circuits currently deploy—a tension that exists because 
the factors used to assess rationality seem to contradict each 
 
 10 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court; A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev 
1, 8 (1972). 
 11 See Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court Can Strike Down Marriage Restrictions under 
Rational-Basis Review, 37 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 331, 333 (2013) (describing rational 
basis review as a “free pass for legislation”). 
 12 See Part II.A. 
 13 See Part II.B. 
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other—by proposing that circuits reframe their inquiry to focus 
on the interconnectedness of resident and nonresident voter 
communities. 
I.  VOTING RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
This Part sets out the background of the Supreme Court’s ap-
proach to vote dilution. Part I.A first clarifies the type of vote di-
lution discussed in this Comment. Part I.B then describes the 
“one person, one vote” principle that the Court has articulated, 
while Part I.C identifies the exceptions to that principle that the 
Court has carved out. Finally, Part I.D sets out the standards 
used to review equal protection claims, both generally and in the 
voting context specifically. 
A. Vote Dilution Generally 
Supreme Court jurisprudence treats some rights as funda-
mental because they “are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Na-
tion’s history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
they were sacrificed.”14 The right to vote is largely considered fun-
damental by the Supreme Court.15 The Court has therefore pro-
tected it from state laws designed to either directly deny or indi-
rectly burden certain individuals’ rights to participate in 
elections.16 Decisions on the issue extend this protection to several 
different types of elections, including those that are local in 
scope.17 The fundamental nature of the right to vote should, and 
 
 14 Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720–21 (1997) (quotation marks omitted). 
 15 See Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 370 (1886) (calling voting “a fundamental 
political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights”). But see Joshua A. Douglas, Is the 
Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 143, 162–63 (2008) (arguing 
that while the Court has labeled the right to vote a fundamental one, its treatment of 
voting rights does not always adhere to that declaration). 
 16 See, for example, Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 360 (1972) (striking down a 
Tennessee durational residence law as an unconstitutional limitation on the right to vote); 
Kramer v Union Free School District No 15, 395 US 621, 622 (1969) (striking down a New 
York law that prevented otherwise-eligible voters from participating in a school board 
election); Harper v Virginia Board of Elections, 383 US 663, 668–70 (1966) (striking down 
a Virginia law instituting a poll tax as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 17 See, for example, Kramer, 395 US at 626 (school board election); Cipriano v City 
of Houma, 395 US 701, 702 (1969) (per curiam) (municipal bond election). 
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often does, lead courts to provide increased constitutional protec-
tion when states try to deny it to an individual or a group.18 
The Supreme Court has not stopped at protecting voters from 
direct disenfranchisement: it has also upheld challenges to voting 
schemes that allegedly diluted votes because “the right of suffrage 
can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citi-
zen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free ex-
ercise of the franchise.”19 Vote dilution can refer to a variety of 
franchise impairments.20 Broadly, the term refers to the idea that 
once a group is extended the franchise in an election, that group’s 
vote must be able to meaningfully contribute to the political pro-
cess.21 Groups bringing vote dilution claims argue that they rep-
resent some kind of minority—racial, political, or numerical22—
and that while each individual member of the group is able to 
physically vote in a particular election, the group as a whole can-
not actually influence the election’s outcome because its numbers 
 
 18 See Douglas, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 148 (cited in note 15) (noting that fun-
damental rights usually “receive greater constitutional protection” from courts and that 
the government can “encroach upon” them only to a limited extent). 
 19 Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 555 (1964). See also, for example, Wesberry v Sanders, 
376 US 1, 7, 18 (1964) (striking down a statute apportioning congressional districts that 
resulted in unequal representation between those districts); Gray v Sanders, 372 US 368, 
370–74, 381 (1963) (holding that, once a class of voters is specified, each vote must be 
counted equally with each other vote). 
 20 While this Comment focuses specifically on vote dilution claims rooted in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, other constitutional and statutory ba-
ses for vote dilution claims exist. See, for example, Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 47–
48 (1986) (noting that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits racial vote dilution); Gomillion 
v Lightfoot, 364 US 339, 346–47 (1960) (finding that a districting scheme that diluted the 
strength of minority votes violated the Fifteenth Amendment). Some states have imple-
mented protections against vote dilution as well. See, for example, Cal Elec Code § 14027 
(prohibiting election methods that dilute “the rights of voters who are members of a pro-
tected class”); 10 ILCS 120/5-5 (requiring that redistricting plans create districts that protect 
against minority vote dilution); In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 
1176, 83 S3d 597, 598–600 (Fla 2012) (discussing the Florida Constitution’s protections 
against vote dilution). 
 21 See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 Harv 
L Rev 1663, 1677 (2001) (“Dilution doctrine rests on two assumptions . . . first, that there 
is more to ‘voting’ than merely casting a vote, and second, that members of an electoral 
minority should enjoy an equal opportunity to coalesce effectively despite the mandate of 
majority rule.”); James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure 
of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U Pa L Rev 893, 922 
(1997) (“Although these claims go by many different names—‘vote dilution,’ lack of an ‘ef-
fective’ or ‘meaningful’ vote, and the inability to ‘elect legislators of their choice,’ for exam-
ple—the underlying contention is almost always the same: the voter claims that having 
the vote is not enough.”) (citations omitted). 
 22 See Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 Yale L J 1888, 1900 (2012) (identifying 
these three types of vote dilution claims). 
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are unconstitutionally overwhelmed in some way.23 Importantly, 
this vote dilution framework characterizes the right to vote as an 
aggregate, or group, right, rather than one belonging solely to the 
individual.24 This is unusual and has consequences for constitu-
tional review of vote dilution claims because equal protection ju-
risprudence has evolved in a highly individualistic context.25 
When a group of voters claims that its voting power is uncon-
stitutionally overwhelmed, the claim could be that the group is 
overwhelmed either quantitatively or qualitatively.26 Quantita-
tive vote dilution refers to claims that voters in a particular dis-
trict are numerically devalued when compared to voters in an-
other district.27 Qualitative vote dilution instead refers to the 
impaired “political effectiveness of an identifiable subgroup.”28 
Nonresident vote dilution claims implicate qualitative dilution is-
sues. In these cases, residents assert that their votes are diluted 
because an equal franchise is granted to uninterested voters.29 
These residents claim to be members not of the same racial or 
political group but merely of an identifiable group who “are re-
quired to share their vote with others whose interests are signifi-
cantly less.”30 
 
 23 See White v Regester, 412 US 755, 765–70 (1973) (upholding a vote dilution chal-
lenge brought by minority voters in two Texas counties due to evidence that “the political 
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the 
group in question”). See also Fishkin, 121 Yale L J at 1893–99 (cited in note 22) (describing 
various ways to conceptualize and equalize the weight of individuals’ votes). 
 24 See Fishkin, 121 Yale L J at 1899 (cited in note 22) (“[O]ne person, one vote claims 
in particular are about the interests of numerical groups—that is, collections of people who 
happen to live within a given geographic area—in securing representation in proportion 
to their numbers.”) (citation omitted); Gerken, 114 Harv L Rev at 1666–67 (cited in note 
21) (calling vote dilution “unusual” because “the individual injury at issue cannot be 
proved without reference to the status of the group as a whole; no individual can assert 
that her vote has been diluted unless she can prove that other members of her group have 
been distributed unfairly within the districting scheme”). 
 25 See Gerken, 114 Harv L Rev at 1667 (cited in note 21) (noting the “increasingly 
individualistic, antiessentialist vision of rights expressed in the Supreme Court’s [more] 
recent equal protection cases”). See also id at 1741–42 (describing the trouble that courts 
can have in addressing issues in connection with statutory vote dilution if they ignore the 
aggregate nature of the harm it represents). 
 26 Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness 
in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 Harv CR–CL L Rev 173, 176 (1989). 
 27 Id. For an example of a quantitative vote dilution claim, see Reynolds, 377 US at 540. 
 28 Karlan, 24 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 176 (cited in note 26). 
 29 See Note, 93 Harv L Rev at 1498–1501 (cited in note 6) (describing these chal-
lenges as “exclusion” vote dilution cases). 
 30 Melvyn R. Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt: Reappraising the Right to Vote in 
Terms of Political “Interest” and Vote Dilution, 33 Case W Res L Rev 1, 38 n 167 (1982). 
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B. The “One Person, One Vote” Principle 
Vote dilution claims sometimes invoke the “one person, one 
vote” principle.31 The Supreme Court in Reynolds v Sims32 popu-
larized this phrase when it established that “an individual’s right to 
vote . . . is unconstitutionally impaired” under the Equal Protection 
Clause when it is diluted compared to the votes of other citizens 
in the same election.33 The challenge in Reynolds concerned an 
apportionment plan in which Alabama legislature districts had 
wildly unequal populations, thus diluting the weight of votes in 
more-populous districts.34 For example, one county containing ap-
proximately 13,000 people was allocated 2 representatives in the 
Alabama House of Representatives, while a county with a popu-
lation of approximately 314,000 received only 3.35 
The Court held that this situation implicated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.36 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”37 According to Reynolds, the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits such vote dilution in order to ensure 
that all citizens have a “full and effective” voice in the affairs of 
their political community.38 Reynolds therefore indicated that one 
group of voters could not arbitrarily exercise more or less voting 
power than another.39 
While Reynolds concerned a statewide election, the Court has 
made it clear that its principle applies to local government elec-
tions as well.40 In fact, whenever a popular election takes place at 
the state or local level to elect someone to perform governmental 
functions, the Equal Protection Clause requires that each quali-
fied voter receive an equal chance to participate.41 At all levels of 
 
 31 See Gray, 372 US at 381 (introducing the term “one person, one vote” in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence). 
 32 377 US 533 (1964). 
 33 Id at 568. 
 34 Id at 540. 
 35 Id at 545–46. 
 36 Reynolds, 377 US at 565–66. 
 37 US Const Amend XIV, § 1. 
 38 Reynolds, 377 US at 565. 
 39 Id at 568. 
 40 Avery v Midland County, 390 US 474, 484–85 (1968) (holding that local govern-
ment districts having “general governmental powers” over the geographic area served by 
the elected body cannot deviate from the one person, one vote rule). 
 41 Hadley v Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 US 50, 54–55, 
58–59 (1970) (holding that one person, one vote applied to an election of trustees for a 
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government, then, if a voter does not have this equal chance, her 
fundamental right to vote has been impaired, no matter what 
group she belongs to and even if she had the ability to physically 
access the voting booth and cast her vote.42 
Although Reynolds remains valid precedent, the implications 
of what “one person, one vote” really guarantees are far from set-
tled. For example, it has not been clearly established what the 
correct denominator is for these claims; in other words, it is not 
clear whether there is a truly correct population base to equalize 
across in ensuring that the equality promised by one person, one 
vote is fulfilled. The Supreme Court recently confronted this very 
question in Evenwel v Abbott43 and upheld the validity of using 
total population in this calculation, as most states do.44 The ap-
pellants in this case had argued that states, when drawing legis-
lative districts to equalize votes, should do so in a way that in-
cludes only each district’s eligible voters.45 The respondents 
argued in turn that the choice to instead use the total population 
of each district (including children, aliens, and others ineligible to 
vote) as a baseline is a valid one.46 The Court affirmed the use of 
the total population measure, although it did not resolve whether 
the total eligible voter denominator could also be used.47 
A more fundamental issue at play in the Evenwel appeal was 
whether this choice of denominator—total eligible voters or total 
population—was even a proper issue for courts to decide. The 
three-judge district court opinion reviewed by the Supreme Court 
answered this question in the negative: “Plaintiffs are asking us 
to interfere with a choice that the Supreme Court has unambigu-
ously left to the states absent the unconstitutional inclusion or 
 
junior college district because in “decid[ing] whether a State is required by the Constitu-
tion to give each qualified voter the same power in an election open to all, there is no 
discernible, valid reason why constitutional distinctions should be drawn on the basis of 
the purpose of the election”). 
 42 See Fishkin, 121 Yale L J at 1903 (cited in note 22) (“Rather than reifying a par-
ticular set of numerical groups as the set to protect, one person, one vote indirectly protects 
them all.”). 
 43 136 S Ct 1120 (2016). 
 44 Id at 1123. 
 45 See id at 1125 (describing the appellants’ argument that their votes would be di-
luted unless the denominator used to apportion districts was comprised only of the citizen 
voting age population). 
 46 Id at 1126 (describing the respondents’ argument that jurisdictions can use any 
baseline “so long as the choice is rational and not invidiously discriminatory”).  
 47 Evenwel, 136 S Ct at 1132–33. 
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exclusion of specific protected groups of individuals.”48 The Evenwel 
opinion instead directly approved the total population baseline, 
though, perhaps because of its overwhelming use by states49 and 
the observation that “the Court has always assumed the permis-
sibility of drawing districts to equalize total population.”50 Not all 
justices agreed that this was the correct approach, however.51 Fur-
thermore, the Court left open the possibility that a future legisla-
ture could in fact use a different denominator in calculating the 
voter population to equalize without violating the one person, one 
vote principle. This is particularly true at the local level, as mu-
nicipalities are traditionally allowed to experiment in matters of 
governance as long as the jurisdiction continues to meet constitu-
tional requirements.52 
The idea that courts cannot even review particular vote dilu-
tion claims extends beyond the numerical apportionment context. 
In Holder v Hall,53 for example, a fractured Court held that when 
faced with a racial vote dilution claim brought under § 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act,54 “a court must find a reasonable alternative 
practice as a benchmark against which to measure the existing 
voting practice.”55 In other words, a vote dilution claim under the 
Voting Rights Act is not justiciable when the plaintiffs cannot 
point to some norm against which the dilutive practice can be 
measured.56 “[W]ithout such a benchmark, measuring the dilutive 
effects of the system in question would be impossible.”57 
 
 48 Evenwel v Perry, 2014 WL 5780507, *4 (WD Tex) (quotation marks omitted). See 
also Burns v Richardson, 384 US 73, 92 (1966) (“The decision to include or exclude [transient 
or short-term residents] involves choices about the nature of representation with which 
we have been shown no constitutionally founded reason to interfere.”). 
 49 Evenwel, 136 S Ct at 1124. 
 50 Id at 1131. 
 51 See id at 1133 (Thomas concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the one person, 
one vote principle is fundamentally flawed because the states have such leeway in deter-
mining how to apportion districts: “The Constitution leaves the choice [of denominator] to 
the people alone—not to this Court”). 
 52 See Avery, 390 US at 485 (“[T]he Constitution and this Court are not roadblocks 
in the path of innovation, experiment, and development among units of local government.”). 
 53 512 US 874 (1994). 
 54 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, 437 (1965), codified as amended at 52 USC § 10301. 
 55 Hall, 512 US at 880 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 56 See id at 880–81 (Kennedy) (plurality). See also White v Alabama, 74 F3d 1058, 
1072–73 (11th Cir 1996) (applying Hall to a vote dilution claim and concluding that, be-
cause there was no nonspeculative benchmark for the plaintiffs’ claim, the case had to be 
dismissed). 
 57 Martin Patrick Averill, Note, Holder v. Hall: Sizing Up Vote Dilution in the ’90s, 
73 NC L Rev 1949, 1977 (1995). See also Reno v Bossier Parish School Board, 520 US 471, 
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These principles have consequences for nonresident vote di-
lution claims. If a legislature decides that nonresidents should 
vote in a particular election, and that decision does not invidi-
ously discriminate against a protected group, perhaps plaintiffs’ 
vote dilution claims are not reviewable. Similarly, if there is no 
identifiable benchmark against which a nonresident vote dilution 
claim can be measured, there is no basis for courts to be involved 
in deciding whether the legislative choice to implement the non-
resident voting scheme is appropriate. These implications are ex-
plored in Part III. 
C. Interest Exceptions to the “One Person, One Vote” Principle 
While the Supreme Court has protected the right to an 
equally weighted vote, it has also delineated some circumstances 
in which the one person, one vote principle does not apply. In sev-
eral decisions invalidating election schemes as incompatible with 
this principle, the Court also identified certain situations that 
might not implicate this rule.58 These situations largely reflect a 
concern with forcing nongoverning districts that do not affect all 
residents equally to nonetheless give every one of those residents 
the same voice in the district’s affairs. The implication is that in 
such districts, those who could be extended the franchise, but 
have no interest in the outcome of an election, do not necessarily 
need to have an equally weighted vote, or even any vote at all. 
The Court later expanded on this concept in cases involving 
nongoverning special-purpose districts. In Salyer Land Co v Tulare 
Lake Basin Water Storage District,59 residents of an area included 
in a special water district challenged a voting scheme for the dis-
trict’s board of directors that limited the franchise to landown-
ers.60 The Court concluded that this was acceptable because, as 
 
480 (1997) (“[T]he very concept of vote dilution implies—and, indeed, necessitates—the 
existence of an ‘undiluted’ practice against which the fact of dilution may be measured.”). 
 58 See Hadley, 397 US at 56 (acknowledging that Reynolds would not apply when 
those elected would not perform “normal governmental” duties); Avery, 390 US at 483–84 
(noting that “special-purpose” governments affecting some citizens more than others could 
give greater voice to those affected without running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause); 
Kramer, 395 US at 632 (leaving open the possibility that “the State in some circumstances 
might limit the exercise of the franchise to those ‘primarily interested’ in or ‘primarily 
affected’” by an election). 
 59 410 US 719 (1973). 
 60 Id at 724–25. 
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contemplated by earlier precedent,61 the water district had a lim-
ited purpose that disproportionately affected property owners.62 
Other cases have similarly held that, when one group is primarily 
burdened and benefitted by an elected body’s activities, one per-
son, one vote compliance is unnecessary.63 Thus, if a district has 
a narrow purpose distinguishable from that of a typical govern-
ment, uninterested residents of that district do not need a vote in 
that district’s affairs.64 
In other contexts, however, the Court has rejected the idea 
that the differential interests of residents can lead to exemptions 
from the one person, one vote principle. In Cipriano v City of 
Houma,65 the Court examined an election scheme giving only 
property taxpayers the right to vote in municipal elections called 
to approve the issuance of utility revenue bonds.66 The govern-
ment defended the scheme by pointing to the “special pecuniary 
interest” property owners had in the election.67 The Court held 
that this scheme was unconstitutional because, even assuming the 
government’s contention was true, the utility system’s operations 
affected all residents of the district.68 As the Court has noted else-
where, “[W]hen all citizens are affected in important ways by a 
 
 61 See Hadley, 397 US at 56; Avery, 390 US at 484–85. 
 62 Salyer, 410 US at 728. The purpose of the district was to store and distribute water 
for farming: “It provide[d] no other general public services such as schools, housing, trans-
portation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal 
body.” Id at 728–29. All costs were assessed against land. Id at 729. 
 63 See, for example, Ball v James, 451 US 355, 370 (1981) (holding that a local power 
district could restrict the franchise to property owners because only they were committing 
capital to it through taxation); Associated Enterprises, Inc v Toltec Watershed Improvement 
District, 410 US 743, 744–45 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that a Wyoming watershed dis-
trict could grant the right to vote to only landowners and weight votes according to land-
holdings because the district disproportionately affected this group). 
 64 See, for example, Town of Lockport, New York v Citizens for Community Action at 
the Local Level, Inc, 430 US 259, 271–73 (1977) (recognizing that city and county voters 
may have different interests in a referendum election, and therefore finding that it did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause to treat their votes differently); Carlson v Wiggins, 
675 F3d 1134, 1140–42 (8th Cir 2012) (upholding a restriction of the franchise to attorneys 
in an election to fill seats on Iowa’s State Judicial Nominating Commission because, in the 
court’s view, the Commission served a narrow function that disproportionately affected 
attorneys). 
 65 395 US 701 (1969) (per curiam). 
 66 Id at 702. 
 67 Id at 704. 
 68 Id at 705–06 (“[T]he operation of the utility systems—gas, water, and electric—
affects virtually every resident of the city, nonproperty owners as well as property owners.”). 
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governmental decision . . . the Constitution does not permit . . . 
the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise.”69 
There is a discernable concern in these cases with defining 
the interest a particular voting group has in influencing an elec-
tion’s outcome. Being merely trivially affected by the outcome 
clearly does not render someone “interested” in the constitutional 
sense.70 That is, different groups can have different levels of in-
terest in the election’s outcome, but the Constitution does not al-
ways mandate that all groups have the chance to vote. Most elec-
tions will affect those beyond the jurisdiction of the political entity 
being elected, and some kind of limiting principle is necessary to 
confine the franchise to those who are truly interested in the result. 
This relates back to vote dilution claims: Although the one 
person, one vote cases are not explicitly about vote dilution, the 
interest exception they create touches directly on that issue. Once 
uninterested voters are allowed to vote, their participation can 
dilute the votes of those who are truly interested.71 In Salyer, for 
example, an unspoken implication of the Court’s decision is that, 
once uninterested residents can vote, interested landowners will 
have a much smaller voice in matters that most directly affect 
them.72 This issue appears in the nonresident vote dilution chal-
lenges discussed in Part II. 
D. Constitutional Review Standards in the Voting Rights 
Context 
Parts I.A through I.C demonstrate how and when courts will 
protect the right to vote from unconstitutional dilution in viola-
tion of the one person, one vote principle. They also demonstrate 
 
 69 City of Phoenix v Kolodziejski, 399 US 204, 209, 213 (1970) (holding that elections 
to approve general obligation bond issuances cannot be restricted to property owners). See 
also Hill v Stone, 421 US 289, 300–01 (1975) (holding that a municipal bond election 
scheme, similar to the one at issue in Cipriano, was unconstitutional). 
 70 See, for example, Southern California Rapid Transit District v Bolen, 822 P2d 875, 
886 (Cal 1992) (explaining that, in a special-district election, while non-property-owning 
residents would be affected to some extent by the election’s result, that did not mean they 
needed access to the franchise). 
 71 See Durchslag, 33 Case W Res L Rev at 39 (cited in note 30) (“The less ‘interest’ 
the claimants have in decisions of the entity in which they seek the vote, the more likely 
it is that granting their claim will dilute the vote of those who already possess it.”). 
 72 See Salyer, 410 US at 730–31 (noting that, because landowners face substantial 
assessments from the water district that nonlandowners do not share, it is reasonable to 
assure them a dominant voice in the district’s governance). This dominance would be di-
luted if nonlandowners were also given a voice in this process. See Durchslag, 33 Case W 
Res L Rev at 40 (cited in note 30). 
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that there are circumstances in which the state may differentiate 
between classes of voters with differing interest levels in an election 
without running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. But what 
tools do courts use to distinguish between these circumstances? 
Usually, the standard of review used to analyze a state’s ac-
tion is dispositive.73 When courts review laws for potential equal 
protection violations, including those violations related to funda-
mental rights infringements,74 the main standards of review used 
are rational basis, strict scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny.75 As 
described below, the rigidly tiered system of review that devel-
oped in traditional equal protection cases has evolved into a more 
flexible approach when potential infringements of individual vot-
ing rights are involved. 
1. Constitutional review standards generally. 
Before determining the validity of a law facing an equal pro-
tection challenge, a court needs to identify the appropriate level 
of constitutional review to use in its analysis.76 Challenged laws 
or actions that do not “burden[ ] a suspect group or a fundamental 
interest” are reviewed using the rational basis standard.77 When 
applying this standard, a court asks if there is a rational relation-
ship between the state action and some legitimate government 
purpose: if such a rational relationship exists, then the state’s ac-
tion will not “run afoul” of the Constitution.78 Courts reason that, 
if no suspect infringement exists, the democratic process is a suf-
ficient means of addressing “improvident” legislation; the judicial 
 
 73 See, for example, San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 
16–17 (1973). 
 74 For an example of a fundamental rights infringement, see Skinner v Oklahoma, 
316 US 535, 541 (1942) (striking down a sterilization law as an equal protection violation 
that infringed on a fundamental right). 
 75 See Rodriguez, 411 US at 16–17 (articulating the dominant tiered framework). See 
also Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Putting the Government to the (Heightened, Intermediate, or 
Strict) Scrutiny Test: Disparate Application Shows Not All Rights and Powers Are Created 
Equal, 10 Fla Coastal L Rev 421, 433–36 (2009) (explaining the different levels of review 
courts use in constitutional challenges). 
 76 See Bjornestad v Hulse, 229 Cal App 3d 1568, 1587 (1991). 
 77 Vance v Bradley, 440 US 93, 96–97 (1979). 
 78 Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 320 (1993). See also Bradley, 440 US at 97 (noting that 
when no suspect burden exists, the Court “will not overturn [ ] a statute unless the varying 
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combi-
nation of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature’s actions were 
irrational”). 
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system need not be involved.79 Rational basis review is quite defer-
ential to the state in this regard.80 Because of this, common wisdom 
articulates rational basis review as a “free pass for legislation.”81 
If a law involves a suspect classification or infringes on a fun-
damental interest, however, courts use the more exacting strict 
scrutiny review standard.82 In these situations, the rationale 
goes, courts must step in to ensure that legislatures are not acting 
in a way that prevents the democratic process from addressing 
improper legislation.83 Under strict scrutiny review, “the state 
must show the law serves a compelling governmental interest and 
that any distinction drawn is necessary to further that interest.”84 
Strict scrutiny has been called “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact” 
because any law reviewed using this standard is unlikely to sur-
vive the heightened level of review that it represents.85 
A third tier of scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, also exists. 
This tier applies to equal protection challenges based on gender 
classifications, among others,86 and requires that such classifica-
tions “serve important governmental objectives and [ ] be substan-
tially related to the achievement of those objectives.”87 Because of 
 
 79 Bradley, 440 US at 97. 
 80 See Bjornestad, 229 Cal App 3d at 1587, citing McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 
425–26 (1961). 
 81 Yoshino, 37 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 333 (cited in note 11). Although this 
formulation holds true in most cases, the rational basis standard has been applied more 
robustly in some contexts. See, for example, City of Cleburne, Texas v Cleburne Living 
Center, Inc, 473 US 432, 446, 450 (1985) (applying rational basis review to a zoning ordi-
nance that excluded homes for the mentally ill and holding that the ordinance violated the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 82 See Johnson v California, 543 US 499, 505 (2005) (noting that racial classifications 
must be reviewed using strict scrutiny); Harper, 383 US at 670 (“We have long been mind-
ful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection 
Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized 
and carefully confined.”). 
 83 See City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co, 488 US 469, 493 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of 
strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of [suspect classifications] by assuring 
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly 
suspect tool.”). 
 84 Bjornestad, 229 Cal App 3d at 1587, citing Blumstein, 405 US at 342–43 (emphases 
added). 
 85 Gunther, 86 Harv L Rev at 8 (cited in note 10). As with rational basis review, this 
usual rule is not an invariable one. See, for example, Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306, 326, 
334–35 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to a law school affirmative action scheme and hold-
ing that it satisfied this test as a “narrowly tailored” plan).  
 86 See Clark v Jeter, 486 US 456, 461 (1988) (“Between these extremes of rational 
basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has 
been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”). 
 87 Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 197 (1976). 
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intermediate scrutiny’s focus on equal protection challenges to 
gender-based classifications, it has not been applied to the voting 
rights context.88 
2.  Constitutional review standards in the voting rights 
context. 
The vote dilution claims considered in this Comment are 
equal protection claims, thus implicating the standards of review 
discussed above.89 But laws involving voting rights present 
unique issues of constitutional review. In traditional equal pro-
tection litigation, a tiered system of review exists.90 As discussed 
below, that is not necessarily the case with litigation involving 
election laws that burden an individual’s right to vote. 
Early cases considering voting rights used this tiered system. 
Therefore, laws that outright denied the right to vote, or classified 
voters along suspect lines, received strict scrutiny review. In Kramer 
v Union Free School District No 15,91 the Court applied strict scru-
tiny to a school board election regime that excluded some otherwise-
qualified voters in the school district, holding that “if a challenged 
state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents 
of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, 
the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary 
to promote a compelling state interest.”92 The plaintiff in this case 
was an unmarried adult resident of the relevant school district 
who owned no land within the district and had no children who at-
tended the district’s schools.93 He was denied the ability to vote in 
the district’s elections based on a state law requiring that otherwise-
eligible voters own property in the school district, be married to a 
property owner, or be the parent or guardian of a child enrolled in 
the local school district in order to participate.94 The Court held 
that this law was unconstitutional because it failed to meet the 
 
 88 See Clark, 486 US at 461; Greenblatt, 10 Fla Coastal L Rev at 450–52 (cited in 
note 75). 
 89 See Gerken, 114 Harv L Rev at 1665–66 (cited in note 21) (describing the equal 
protection framework for vote dilution claims). But see notes 53–57 and accompanying 
text and Part III.A (noting that these claims may not be cognizable). 
 90 See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 Stan L Rev 1105, 
1116–17 (1989). See also Part I.D.1. 
 91 395 US 621 (1969). 
 92 Id at 627 (emphasis added). 
 93 Id at 624–25. 
 94 Id at 623. 
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requirements of strict scrutiny.95 Importantly, the plaintiff was 
already a resident of the relevant jurisdiction: the distinction be-
tween voters and nonvoters rested on something other than resi-
dence, thus subjecting the law to strict scrutiny.96 Other decisions 
have similarly held that voter classifications in non-special-district 
elections based on characteristics other than age, citizenship, or 
residency will receive this stricter constitutional review.97 
Crucially, though, not every law affecting the right to vote 
has been reviewed using this standard: classifications based on 
citizenship, age, and residency requirements do not receive strict 
scrutiny. Election laws usually classify people in this way, and “to 
subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the 
hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated eq-
uitably and efficiently.”98 Holt Civic Club v City of Tuscaloosa99 
provides an apt example. The Court applied rational basis review 
to claims that individuals who were residents of an unincorpo-
rated community near Tuscaloosa, and subject to that city’s police 
power, should have been extended the franchise in municipal 
elections.100 The Court did not find strict scrutiny applicable be-
cause the plaintiffs did not live within the Tuscaloosa city limits; 
they could not avail themselves of that standard merely because 
the city’s municipal decisions affected them.101 Other decisions 
similarly clarified that rational basis review applies to laws that 
classify voters based on nonsuspect categories,102 to election laws 
in the context of nongoverning districts,103 and to laws that create 
 
 95 Kramer, 395 US at 633. 
 96 See id at 622. 
 97 See, for example, Stone, 421 US at 297–98 (applying strict scrutiny to a voter clas-
sification based on property ownership in a non-special-purpose election); Kolodziejski, 399 
US at 209 (same); Cipriano, 395 US at 704 (same). 
 98 Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428, 432–33 (1992). 
 99 439 US 60 (1978). 
 100 Id at 62–63, 70. 
 101 See id at 68–70 (describing how one person, one vote applies only to individuals 
residing within a single geographic boundary). See also id at 70 (“The line heretofore 
marked by this Court’s voting qualifications decisions coincides with the geographical 
boundary of the governmental unit at issue, and we hold that appellants’ case, like their 
homes, falls on the farther side.”). 
 102 See, for example, Mixon v Ohio, 193 F3d 389, 405 (6th Cir 1999) (applying Holt 
and Kramer to a voting-related residency restriction and holding that rational basis ap-
plied). See also Kramer, 395 US at 625 (confirming that “[s]tates have the power to impose 
reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements on the availability of the ballot”). 
 103 See, for example, Salyer, 410 US at 731 (applying rational basis review to a special-
purpose district election); Ball, 451 US at 371 (same). 
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minor deviations from perfect one person, one vote compliance.104 
While cases like Holt do not involve nonresident vote dilution 
claims, they are closely related. Nonresidents bringing cases like 
Holt argue that something about their interest in an election’s 
outcome necessitates their inclusion in the franchise. As de-
scribed in Part III.B, the level of constitutional review given to 
these claims has implications for the level of review given to non-
resident vote dilution claims. 
The Court developed a more flexible approach for reviewing 
election law challenges in Anderson v Celebrezze105 and Burdick v 
Takushi.106 This approach is premised on the idea that the state 
always has an interest in regulating elections to ensure that they 
proceed fairly and in an organized fashion.107 In enacting these 
regulations, an individual’s ability to vote will inevitably be im-
paired in some way that makes it more difficult or even impossi-
ble to freely exercise the franchise.108 How severely this ability is 
impaired depends on the specific facts surrounding the election 
regulation at issue.109 
The Supreme Court thus articulated a test designed to cap-
ture this aspect of election regulations and structure the appropri-
ate level of constitutional review accordingly. Under the Anderson-
Burdick approach, to decide the correct level of scrutiny to apply, 
a court reviewing a challenge to an election-related restriction 
must weigh the individual’s constitutional right at stake against 
the exact interest the state puts forward to justify the burden on 
the right.110 The court must take into account “the extent to which 
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s 
rights.”111 After considering these factors, if the court decides that 
 
 104 See, for example, Brown v Thomson, 462 US 835, 842–43 (1983) (describing the 
rule that population deviations of less than 10 percent between districts are minor and 
justifiable if they “may reasonably be said to advance a rational state policy”) (brackets 
omitted). 
 105 460 US 780 (1983). 
 106 504 US 428 (1992). 
 107 See Anderson, 460 US at 788, citing Storer v Brown, 415 US 724, 730 (1974). 
 108 See Anderson, 460 US at 788 (describing how “complex election codes . . . inevita-
bly affect[ ]—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote”). 
 109 See Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 Ind L J 
1289, 1324–25 (2011) (using the example of laws regulating poll closing times to demonstrate 
how “[n]o single, binary ‘litmus-paper test’” can adequately separate constitutional ver-
sions of such regulations from unconstitutional versions). 
 110 Anderson, 460 US at 789. 
 111 Id. 
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the individual’s important right is burdened by severe re-
strictions, then the regulation at issue must be “narrowly drawn 
to advance a state interest of compelling importance.”112 In other 
words, strict scrutiny applies.113 If the law imposes only reasonable 
restrictions on the right to vote, though, more deferential review 
will apply, and the important interest that states always have in 
regulating elections will generally provide the requisite rational 
justification.114 
The Anderson-Burdick test thus seems to reject the tradi-
tional tiers of review used in equal protection analysis. Instead, 
courts must undertake a “direct balancing” of a plaintiff’s injury 
against the state’s asserted interest in order to determine the cor-
rect level of scrutiny to apply.115 Questions remain, though, about 
how this balancing is actually implemented and the extent to 
which it truly dispenses with the tiered review system.116 Com-
mentators acknowledge that case law is not always clear as to 
whether Anderson and Burdick created a true sliding scale in-
volving intermediate review for nonsevere yet nontrivial re-
strictions, or whether they merely identified a two-tiered system 
in which only severe burdens receive strict scrutiny.117 In cases 
since Burdick, courts have not been consistent in their use of this 
 
 112 Burdick, 504 US at 434, quoting Norman v Reed, 502 US 279, 289 (1992). 
 113 See, for example, Libertarian Party of Ohio v Blackwell, 462 F3d 579, 593 (6th Cir 
2006) (finding that a restriction imposed by state election law created a severe burden and 
that strict scrutiny therefore applied); Partnoy v Shelley, 277 F Supp 2d 1064, 1078 (SD 
Cal 2003) (holding that a state recall election voting scheme substantially burdened the 
plaintiffs’ rights and applying strict scrutiny). 
 114 See Burdick, 504 US at 434, citing Anderson, 460 US at 788. See also Crawford v 
Marion County Election Board, 553 US 181, 190–91 (2008) (Stevens) (plurality) (reaffirm-
ing the use of this balancing test). 
 115 Muhammad At-Tauhidi, Note, Access v. Integrity: Determining the Constitutional-
ity of Voter ID Laws under Anderson v. Celebrezze, 17 Temple Political & CR L Rev 215, 
229 (2007). Note that this does not necessarily invalidate the use of strict scrutiny in cases 
like Kramer; the classification in that case was invidious because it was based on some-
thing other than age, citizenship, or residence. The Court has not overruled this precedent. 
Id at 231. 
 116 See Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and 
the Price of Democracy, 86 Denver U L Rev 1023, 1052 n 148 (2009) (collecting scholarship 
describing Burdick as “confusing” and “muddying”). 
 117 See, for example, Fishkin, 86 Ind L J at 1324 (cited in note 109) (describing the 
different ways to read the Burdick test); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial 
Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U Pa L Rev 313, 330 
(2007) (noting the ambiguity in Burdick on this question). See also Crawford, 553 US at 
204 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (reading Burdick as creating a two-tiered ap-
proach to reviewing election laws); id at 190 n 8 (Stevens) (plurality) (disagreeing with the 
concurrence that Burdick created a “novel deferential ‘important regulatory interests’ 
standard”). 
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sliding scale analysis.118 But the more flexible balancing approach 
does have support in some of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
In Burdick itself, the Court noted that the “rigorousness of [its] 
inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the 
extent to which a challenged regulation” burdens constitutional 
rights.119 This balancing approach has thus remained viable in 
circuit court decisions.120 
Furthermore, it is unclear if vote dilution claims even fit into 
this framework, considering the aggregate conception of the vote 
dilution burden.121 The Anderson-Burdick test requires courts to 
balance the burden on an individual’s right to vote against the 
state’s precise proffered interest. In cases of vote dilution, the in-
dividual’s burden is completely undifferentiated from other mem-
bers of the group: “[N]o group member is injured more or less than 
any other.”122 A plaintiff who actually had the ability to cast a vote 
in the election may additionally struggle to convince a court that 
her right to vote has been burdened at all. Courts considering a 
single plaintiff may therefore fail to adequately assess the burden 
placed on that plaintiff by the relevant election regulation—espe-
cially if that plaintiff had the actual ability to physically cast a 
vote—and thus underweight the size of the burden that such a 
plaintiff truly suffers.123 Nonetheless, at least one nonresident 
 
 118 See Douglas, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 170 (cited in note 15) (describing confu-
sion in lower courts resulting from the Court’s inconsistent approach to the treatment of 
voting rights). 
 119 Burdick, 504 US at 434. See also Elmendorf, 156 U Pa L Rev at 330 n 66 (cited in 
note 117) (“[I]f the Court had really meant to consign all nonsevere burdens to rational 
basis scrutiny, it probably would have said as much.”). 
 120 See, for example, Voting for America, Inc v Steen, 732 F3d 382, 393–95 (5th Cir 
2013) (finding that a burden on voting rights was nonsevere but then carefully analyzing 
the regulatory interests put forward by the state to assess the relevant law’s validity); 
Price v New York State Board of Elections, 540 F3d 101, 109–12 (2d Cir 2008) (applying 
Burdick as a balancing test requiring a stronger state justification when the individual 
burden is nontrivial). 
 121 See notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 122 Gerken, 114 Harv L Rev at 1704 (cited in note 21). 
 123 See Ellis, 86 Denver U L Rev at 1064–67 (cited in note 116) (noting in the voter 
identification law context that applying the Anderson-Burdick balancing test is challeng-
ing for courts because it is difficult for courts to adequately assess the size of the burden 
that such laws only indirectly pose for individuals). For an example of a court underweighting 
the effects of vote dilution, see Earnshaw v Jackson, 1996 WL 474363, *4–5 (D Md) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff had no remedy for his equal protection claim based on a failure to 
purge voter rolls because every Maryland citizen had her votes diluted in the exact same 
proportion by this failure to purge: therefore, “no one voting in the November 1994 election 
. . . was treated differently from any other similarly situated voter”). 
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vote dilution case has used this framework,124 and another recent 
case held that Anderson and Burdick apply to other one person, 
one vote challenges.125 This framework thus provides a potential 
way to review nonresident vote dilution claims. 
II.  NONRESIDENT VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS: WHAT STANDARD OF 
REVIEW APPLIES? 
This Part explores how courts have applied the above frame-
work to nonresident vote dilution claims. As previously described, 
these claims can arise when state statutes create election 
schemes that result in overlapping jurisdictions at the local level, 
or when a jurisdiction’s governing document allows nonresident 
property owner voting.126 These claims are underexplored, likely 
because of a pervasive view that “[o]ver inclusiveness [of the fran-
chise] is a lesser constitutional evil than under inclusiveness.”127 
Of course, this view focuses on the interests of those nonresi-
dents who might be disenfranchised by the plaintiffs’ requested 
relief rather than on the interests of the plaintiffs themselves. 
This in turn obscures analysis of the interest that plaintiffs are 
trying to protect: their right to fully weighted votes.128 Plaintiffs 
in these cases argue that 
[t]o empower someone who otherwise would have nothing at 
stake with a vote in a strategic political arena is to endow 
that person with wealth—the value of the benefits obtainable 
 
 124 See Day v Robinwood West Community Improvement District, 693 F Supp 2d 996, 
1005 (ED Mo 2010) (noting that “[c]ourts confronting equal protection claims asserting 
vote dilution resulting from expansion of the voter base have generally employed a standard 
at the rational basis end of the Anderson spectrum”) (citation omitted). 
 125 See Nation v San Juan County, 150 F Supp 3d 1253, 1266 (D Utah 2015) (conclud-
ing that the Anderson-Burdick test must be applied to one person, one vote challenges as 
it “best represents the careful analysis here required under Reynolds”). See also Obama 
for America v Husted, 697 F3d 423, 430 (6th Cir 2012) (noting that “Anderson explicitly 
imported the analysis used in equal protection cases . . . thus creating a single standard 
for evaluating challenges to voting restrictions”). 
 126 See notes 1–2 and accompanying text. See also Briffault, 60 U Chi L Rev at 396–
401 (cited in note 6) (describing these as “expanded electorates” cases). 
 127 Brown v Board of Commissioners of the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, 722 F 
Supp 380, 398 (ED Tenn 1989). See also Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 Stan 
L Rev 69, 76 (2009) (describing a statutory construction canon that creates a presumption 
favoring a broader right to vote); Note, 93 Harv L Rev at 1502–07 (cited in note 6) (explor-
ing courts’ constitutional review of nonresident vote dilution claims along with inclusion-
ary vote dilution claims and concluding that their differential treatment can be explained 
by a desire to maximize voter participation). 
 128 See Note, 93 Harv L Rev at 1500–01 (cited in note 6). 
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in exchange for her or his vote—at the expense of other par-
ticipants who do have interests inextricably at stake.129  
This argument itself poses problems, as it presupposes that in the 
absence of the inclusion of nonresidents, an ideal district exists in 
which residents’ votes would have the proper weight. If this ideal 
benchmark does not exist, then perhaps these claims are not cog-
nizable at all.130 Instead, the design of the electorate would 
properly be left to the legislature.131 
Despite potential cognizability issues, though, various circuit 
courts have decided to review the merits of nonresident vote dilu-
tion claims. Importantly, in considering the merits of these 
claims, courts have subjected them to different levels of constitu-
tional review. Plaintiffs usually invoke the Fourteenth Amendment 
to make their arguments, implicating the threshold question of 
how closely a court should review the challenged election regula-
tion. As discussed above, the standard of review in an equal pro-
tection challenge can be dispositive.132 
The rest of this Part explores how courts have made these 
decisions and reviewed these claims. Part II.A discusses the 
Fourth Circuit’s application of strict scrutiny. Part II.B discusses 
the circuits using a more deferential rational basis–like standard 
of review, although this test is not the free pass seen in many 
other equal protection contexts. 
A. Strict Scrutiny in the Fourth Circuit 
Locklear v North Carolina State Board of Elections133 estab-
lished the Fourth Circuit’s application of strict scrutiny in the 
nonresident vote dilution context.134 The Locklear plaintiffs chal-
lenged a North Carolina statute establishing the voting structure 
for school boards in the state.135 Robeson County, North Carolina, 
had six school districts, each with its own school board (five city 
 
 129 Frank I. Michelman, Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law: Conceptions of Democ-
racy in American Constitutional Argument; Voting Rights, 41 Fla L Rev 443, 461–62 (1989). 
 130 See Hall, 512 US at 880 (Kennedy) (plurality) (discussing the need for a “reasonable 
alternative practice as a benchmark” in a § 2 voting suit). For a discussion of the difficulty 
Hall recognizes in identifying this benchmark, see notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 131 See Part III.A. 
 132 See Part I.D.1. 
 133 514 F2d 1152 (4th Cir 1975). 
 134 See id at 1154. 
 135 Id at 1153. 
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boards and one county board); each board had exclusive jurisdic-
tion over its own schools.136 The county school board made some 
decisions that affected city residents—such as coordinating trans-
portation—but did not control the city districts.137 Members of 
each of the city boards were elected exclusively by voters residing 
within that city’s school district, but city residents could also vote 
for some county board members.138 The plaintiffs were county 
school district residents who argued that this voting scheme un-
constitutionally diluted their own votes for the county board.139 
The Fourth Circuit interpreted Kramer and Reynolds as re-
quiring strict scrutiny review.140 It viewed Kramer as the requisite 
authority for any case involving infringement of voting rights.141 
While acknowledging that Kramer did not involve vote dilution 
claims, it held that the case’s application of strict scrutiny was 
still relevant because of Reynolds’s language regarding the injury 
that vote dilution poses to voting rights.142 In applying this standard, 
the court described the asserted governmental interest as the city 
voters’ interest in the county board’s management: the state 
pointed to cooperative agreements between the county and city 
boards whereby the county board administered the transporta-
tion system and other resources for both county and city stu-
dents.143 The Fourth Circuit did not find the interests of city 
residents in these programs compelling enough to justify their 
participation in the county board elections.144 Furthermore, even 
if these cooperative agreements did signify a compelling interest, 
the court indicated that allowing city residents to vote would still 
be constitutionally impermissible.145 Allowing city residents to 
vote in county school district elections “give[s] them a voice in the 
operation of the county schools in those noncooperative aspects of 
 
 136 Id. 
 137 Locklear, 514 F2d at 1153, 1155–56. 
 138 Id at 1153. County residents could still vote for the county board members for 
which city residents also voted. Id. County residents who did not reside in the city school 
districts could not vote for members of those city boards. Id. 
 139 Id at 1152–53. 
 140 See id at 1154 (“[W]e conceive the legal question to confront us to be whether a 
compelling state interest justifies permitting residents of city school units to participate 
in the election of these seven members of the county board. If not, the franchise is consti-
tutionally over-inclusive.”). 
 141 See Locklear, 514 F2d at 1154. 
 142 Id, citing Reynolds, 377 US at 555. 
 143 Locklear, 514 F2d at 1155. 
 144 Id. 
 145 See id at 1156 (noting that beyond the cooperative agreements, the county board 
was responsible for only the schools in its own jurisdiction). 
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their operation in which there is no showing that they have any 
interest.”146 
Locklear’s analysis anticipates the approaches of other cir-
cuits to these claims, in that it explicitly balances nonresidents’ 
interest in the election against the interests of residents bringing 
the challenge (as the state’s asserted interest was the interest 
that nonresidents had in the election’s outcome).147 A decisive as-
pect of the Fourth Circuit’s analysis was the overwhelming con-
sequence of giving city residents a vote as compared to their true 
interest in the election’s outcome. While there were joint func-
tions for the cities and the county that the county board adminis-
tered, the fact that city residents could vote for county board 
members based solely on those functions made the nonresident 
voters’ interest less compelling and unable to withstand closer ju-
dicial review. 
A 2012 district court decision considering a preliminary injunc-
tion in the redistricting context signaled the continuing vitality of 
Locklear’s strict scrutiny approach. The court in NAACP–
Greensboro Branch v Guilford County Board of Elections148 con-
fronted a request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the im-
plementation of a redistricting scheme in combination with a new 
election schedule that would leave some county commissioner dis-
tricts underrepresented for a two-year period.149 While this pre-
sented a quantitative dilution claim rather than a nonresident 
vote dilution one, the court followed Locklear’s reasoning and ap-
plied strict scrutiny.150 Because it was “not able to discern a com-
pelling state interest that would permit this type of dilution,” the 
court amended the implementation of the relevant law.151 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 See Locklear, 514 F2d at 1155 (“We do not think that the city voters’ interest . . . 
amounts to a compelling state interest.”). 
 148 858 F Supp 2d 516 (MD NC 2012). 
 149 Id at 522, 525. 
 150 Id at 524. 
 151 Id. 
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B. Rational Basis Review Employed by Other Circuits 
Courts within the Second,152 Fifth,153 Sixth,154 Seventh,155 
Eighth,156 Tenth,157 and Eleventh158 Circuits, as well as several 
state courts,159 have eschewed Locklear’s strict scrutiny approach 
in favor of a more deferential rational basis–like review of non-
resident vote dilution claims. These courts all use the same re-
view standard—the inclusion of nonresident voters must be ra-
tional, and the test of rationality is whether nonresidents have a 
substantial interest in the election. The “substantial interest” re-
quirement creates a form of rational basis review that is more 
stringent than the version typically applied in equal protection 
cases. 
The Sixth Circuit has most explicitly rejected Locklear’s strict 
scrutiny approach. In Duncan v Coffee County, Tennessee,160 a 
case with very similar facts to Locklear, it held that Locklear’s 
definition of nonresidents’ interest had merit but its standard was 
incorrect: “[T]he benchmark for determining whether the inclu-
sion of ‘out-of-district’ voters in another district’s elections uncon-
stitutionally dilutes those votes is whether the decision is irra-
tional.”161 This case concerned three school districts in Coffee 
County, Tennessee, corresponding to the city of Tullahoma, the 
city of Manchester, and rural Coffee County.162 The two cities 
were allowed to vote for the county school district’s board, and 
residents of rural Coffee County brought an equal protection 
claim alleging that the inclusion of Tullahoma residents uncon-
stitutionally diluted their own votes in the county school board 
election.163 
The Duncan court first held that Coffee County was not re-
quired to enfranchise Tullahoma residents in Rural Coffee 
 
 152 See, for example, Collins v Town of Goshen, 635 F2d 954, 959 (2d Cir 1980). 
 153 See, for example, Creel v Freeman, 531 F2d 286, 289 (5th Cir 1976). 
 154 See, for example, Duncan v Coffee County, Tennessee, 69 F3d 88, 94 (6th Cir 1995). 
 155 See, for example, Cantwell v Hudnut, 566 F2d 30, 37 (7th Cir 1977). 
 156 See, for example, Day v Robinwood West Community Improvement District, 693 F 
Supp 2d 996, 1005–06 (ED Mo 2010). 
 157 See, for example, May v Town of Mountain Village, 132 F3d 576, 582 (10th Cir 1997). 
 158 See, for example, Levy v Miami–Dade County, 254 F Supp 2d 1269, 1289 (SD Fla 2003). 
 159 See, for example, Burriss v Anderson County Board of Education, 633 SE2d 482, 
486–87 (SC 2006); Bjornestad v Hulse, 229 Cal App 3d 1568, 1592 (1991). 
 160 69 F3d 88 (6th Cir 1995). 
 161 Id at 94 (emphasis added). 
 162 Id at 90. 
 163 Id at 91. 
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County School District elections because they were nonresi-
dents.164 But the court also noted that the school district could ex-
tend the franchise as long as no unconstitutional dilution of rural 
Coffee County residents’ votes occurred.165 Duncan then rejected 
the “compelling interest” requirement of Locklear, noting the ad-
ministrative concerns inherent in that approach: if a compelling 
state interest were needed to justify any expansion of the voter 
base, then all expansions, however innocuous, would be subject to 
constitutional attack.166 
Although the court in Duncan applied rational basis, it im-
bued that test with more meaning than merely searching for any 
reasonably conceivable set of facts that would support the exten-
sion of the franchise to nonresidents.167 It explored whether non-
resident enfranchisement is rationally related to a legitimate 
state purpose by considering whether the nonresidents had a 
“substantial interest” in the outcome of the election.168 It also laid 
out a four-factor test, based on its reading of important factors in 
other nonresident vote dilution cases, to use in determining 
whether this substantial interest exists: “(1) [t]he degree to which 
one district is financing the other; (2) [t]he voting strength of the 
non-resident voters; (3) [t]he number of, or potential for, cross-
over students; [and] (4) [t]he existence of any joint programs.”169 
In applying this test to the facts of the case before it, the court 
found dispositive the facts that Tullahoma sent substantial 
amounts of its property and sales tax revenues to the Rural Coffee 
County School District, and that there was “only the slimmest 
possibility that Tullahoma residents [could] control the Coffee 
County School Board.”170 Based largely on these two factors, the 
Duncan court held that city residents had a substantial interest 
in the election; it was therefore rational for the state to extend 
them the franchise.171 
 
 164 Duncan, 69 F3d at 94. 
 165 Id (noting that vote dilution is a “term of art” and providing the example that low-
ering the voting age, by increasing the number of eligible voters, “expand[s] the voting 
rolls . . . [b]ut it does not do so unconstitutionally”). 
 166 Id at 95. For a similar sentiment expressed by the Supreme Court, see Burdick, 
504 US at 433. 
 167 For a case applying the very lenient “reasonably conceivable” rational basis standard, 
see McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 426 (1961). 
 168 Duncan, 69 F3d at 94. 
 169 Id at 96. 
 170 Id at 96–97. 
 171 Id at 98. 
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Duncan is representative of other federal and state cases that 
similarly use rational basis, defined by a substantial interest re-
quirement, as the review standard for nonresident vote dilution 
claims.172 Without the presence of this substantial interest, courts 
reason, it would be irrational to allow nonresidents to vote.173 
Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the extension of the 
franchise to nonresidents is irrational because there is no such 
substantial interest.174 
While not all courts in these circuits articulate the same fac-
tors as Duncan, they focus on similar externalities in evaluating 
the interest of nonresidents in an election’s outcome. Two ele-
ments, similar to the most dispositive factors in Duncan, carry 
the most weight in these cases. The first is the financial interest 
nonresidents have in the district at issue. If nonresidents repre-
sent a significant portion of the district’s tax base, or contribute 
financially in some other way, this weighs strongly in favor of 
a substantial interest in the election.175 Cases involving the en-
franchisement of nonresident property owners particularly em-
phasize this factor.176 The second is the possibility that nonresi-
dents can overwhelm the resident population’s vote and dominate 
 
 172 See, for example, Day, 693 F Supp 2d at 1005–06 (defining the test as whether 
residents have a “substantial interest” in the election); Bjornestad, 229 Cal App 3d at 
1592–93 (same); Sutton v Escambia County Board of Education, 809 F2d 770, 772 (11th 
Cir 1987) (same). 
 173 See, for example, Levy, 254 F Supp 2d at 1289 (“Non-residents may have a lesser 
interest, or a different interest, but they at least must have some interest to overcome any 
concerns of irrationality.”); Duncan, 69 F3d at 94 (“A decision to include ‘out-of district’ 
voters in the election is not irrational if Coffee County can show that those voters have a 
substantial interest in the Rural Coffee County School District election.”). 
 174 See Davis v Linville, 864 F2d 127, 129 (11th Cir 1989) (per curiam). 
 175 See, for example, Levy, 254 F Supp 2d at 1290 (citing the tax revenue flowing from 
incorporated cities in Miami-Dade County to the unincorporated area as one basis for ex-
tending the franchise to city residents in county elections); Davis, 864 F2d at 130 (citing 
the county school district’s receipt of sales and property tax revenue as a substantial in-
terest); Collins, 635 F2d at 959 (holding that nonresidents’ financial interest in a water 
district constituted a substantial interest); Cantwell, 566 F2d at 35 (“Taxpayers who par-
ticipate in paying for capital expenditures have an interest in how facilities and equipment 
are used.”); Creel, 531 F2d at 289 (citing “the substantial investment by Jasper residents in 
the vocational school and in the [Walker] county board building” as a substantial interest 
in the Walker County school board elections); Clark v Town of Greenburgh, 436 F2d 770, 772 
(2d Cir 1971) (finding that the tax village residents paid to support 5 percent of the budget 
for the unincorporated area was evidence of a sufficient interest in the town’s elections). 
 176 See, for example, Day, 693 F Supp 2d at 1006 (holding that their property taxes 
gave nonresident landowners a substantial interest in a community improvement dis-
trict’s board elections); May, 132 F3d at 582 (holding that a charter allowing nonresident 
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the election. Domination in this context means that the scheme 
virtually guarantees that nonresident voters will control the elec-
tion to the exclusion of residents.177 The more this possibility ex-
ists, the less likely it is that a court will allow nonresidents to 
keep the franchise.178 While not accorded as much influence, 
courts also consider the other interests expressed in the Duncan 
factors, including stakeholder crossover from the nonresident dis-
trict to the district at issue179 and the existence of concrete bene-
fits for nonresidents flowing from the decisions made by the 
elected body.180 
Importantly, this substantial interest requirement makes ra-
tional basis–like review more robust than the traditional “free 
pass” that the standard is usually considered to represent. Courts 
have used these factors to hold that nonresidents have no sub-
stantial interest, thus rendering their enfranchisement irra-
tional.181 The fact-intensive nature of this inquiry has also led 
 
landowners to vote in town elections was constitutional because these voters owned a ma-
jority of the property in the resort town); Bjornestad, 229 Cal App 3d at 1594 (“Landowners 
bear the weight of financial responsibility for [the water district].”). 
 177 See, for example, Board of County Commissioners of Shelby County, Tennessee v 
Burson, 121 F3d 244, 250 (6th Cir 1997) (failing to name a specific threshold but holding 
that the relevant voting scheme “would unconstitutionally dilute the votes of residents . . . 
by placing the overwhelming majority of ballots in the hands of out-of-district voters”). 
 178 See, for example, Davis, 864 F2d at 129 (“[C]ity residents did not appear to have 
dominated previous elections.”); Sutton, 809 F2d at 774 (holding that the lack of domina-
tion by city residents in county school board elections supported the extension of the fran-
chise to those city residents). 
 179 See, for example, Levy, 254 F Supp 2d at 1290 (“[T]he [nonresident area] and the 
[resident district] share not only revenue and services, but also the same governing body, 
administration, and employees.”); Sutton, 809 F2d at 773–74 (finding that a substantial 
crossover between city and county school districts demonstrated the substantial interest 
of city residents in the county election); Rutledge v Louisiana, 330 F Supp 336, 339–40 
(WD La 1971) (basing its decision to allow city residents to vote in parish school board 
elections in part on the strong student crossover between the two school systems). 
 180 See, for example, Burriss, 633 SE2d at 489 (discussing the spillover effects from 
the county educational system that benefitted all nearby students); Levy, 254 F Supp 2d 
at 1289 (holding that the provision of municipal services by the county’s governing body 
benefitting nonresidents pointed to a substantial interest of those nonresidents in the gov-
erning body’s election). 
 181 See, for example, Burson, 121 F3d at 250 (holding that the voting plan at issue 
“would unconstitutionally dilute the votes of residents in the Shelby County School District 
by placing the overwhelming majority of ballots in the hands of out-of-district voters”); 
Hosford v Ray, 806 F Supp 1297, 1303 (SD Miss 1992) (holding that the extension of the 
franchise to Canton residents in the Madison County superintendent of education elec-
tions was irrational because they did not have a substantial interest in the election); 
Brown, 722 F Supp at 399 (holding that the Chattanooga city charter unconstitutionally 
diluted resident votes); Phillips v Andress, 634 F2d 947, 951 (5th Cir 1981) (holding that 
the extension of the franchise in county school board elections to city residents with a 
separate municipal school board was irrational); County of Tripp v State, 264 NW2d 213, 
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judges in some of these cases to dissent because their analysis of 
the relevant factors differed from the majority, further indicating 
that this kind of government action is not deferentially reviewed 
in all cases.182 
Clearly, in the nonresident vote dilution context, the standard 
of review is less dispositive than it can be in other equal protec-
tion spheres. Rational basis review does not invariably result in 
the judicial deference to state objectives that is usually seen in 
other equal protection contexts. The interest balancing that these 
circuits deploy thus seems to resemble the Anderson-Burdick bal-
ancing test that the Supreme Court articulated for determining 
the constitutionality of individual voting burdens.183 Although 
Anderson-Burdick balancing determines the correct level of re-
view, and while the substantial interest test described here in-
volves the application of only one kind of review, in both contexts 
considerations of the burdens at issue can lead to more robust 
analysis than typically seen with rational basis review. 
III.  A NEW APPROACH TO NONRESIDENT VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS 
As described in Part II, courts have not been consistent in 
their review of nonresident vote dilution claims. The Fourth Circuit 
closely scrutinizes the state’s asserted interest in enfranchising 
nonresidents, while other courts use rational basis review to as-
sess these voting schemes. Once these cases are properly situated 
within Supreme Court precedent, however, the question whether 
strict scrutiny or rational basis applies becomes more complicated 
than merely choosing between these two tiers. 
An initial threshold question not addressed by most of the 
courts considering nonresident vote dilution is whether such 
claims are cognizable at all. In the analogous situation of racial 
vote dilution, cases like Hall establish that a benchmark must 
exist against which the alleged dilution can be measured. If there 
is no such benchmark, a court need not address the merits of the 
issue because there is no identified burden on plaintiffs and their 
group voting power. 
 
219 (SD 1978) (finding that “[t]here is no rational basis, much less a compelling state in-
terest,” for the process used to enfranchise nonresidents when they could overwhelm the 
election). 
 182 See, for example, Sutton, 809 F2d at 775–84 (Clark dissenting); Cantwell, 566 F2d 
at 39–40 (Fairchild dissenting). 
 183 See Part I.D.2. 
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Assuming that these claims are cognizable, though, the sec-
ond threshold question of constitutional review is implicated. To 
resolve the existing split, nonresident vote dilution cases can be 
considered alongside nonresident disenfranchisement cases such 
as Holt. Nonresident disenfranchisement claims involve nonresi-
dents challenging their exclusion from the franchise: these claims 
usually receive rational basis review.184 Some commentators have 
questioned whether these two claims can be reviewed together, as 
one claim questions the expansion of the franchise and the other 
challenges its restriction.185 This clearly implicates different bur-
dens on an individual’s access to the franchise. But both kinds of 
claims involve questions about the legitimacy of residency re-
strictions, and they are considered together here through that 
residency restriction framework. 
The rest of this Part explores potential answers to these 
threshold questions. Part III.A argues that courts can decline to 
review a legislature’s choice to enfranchise nonresidents if no in-
vidious discrimination is involved. Part III.B alternatively argues 
that, if courts find nonresident vote dilution claims cognizable, 
considering them purely as residency restrictions demonstrates 
that the burdens involved are not severe enough to warrant 
wholesale strict scrutiny. Instead, the substantial interest version 
of rational basis that most circuits employ should guide analysis of 
nonresident vote dilution claims. Part III.C then considers the 
practical implications of this substantial interest review. Future 
courts faced with nonresident vote dilution claims should focus on 
whether the border creating a resident/nonresident distinction ar-
tificially separates a unified political community. If the court con-
siders members of both groups to in fact be members of such a 
unified political community, the inclusion of nonresidents in the 
franchise would be rational. 
A. Leaving the Decision to the Legislature 
Before addressing the standard of review issue, courts con-
sidering nonresident vote dilution cases must determine whether 
the residents bringing these actions have stated valid claims. If 
 
 184 See, for example, Holt, 439 US at 70 (“[T]he equal protection issue presented by 
appellants becomes whether the Alabama statutes giving extraterritorial force to certain 
municipal ordinances and powers bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state pur-
pose.”) (emphasis added). But see Little Thunder v South Dakota, 518 F2d 1253, 1256 (8th 
Cir 1975) (applying strict scrutiny to a nonresident disenfranchisement claim). 
 185 See, for example, Note, 93 Harv L Rev at 1501–02 (cited in note 6). 
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residents raising these issues cannot show that the challenged 
voting schemes are dilutive, then courts do not have to decide 
which scrutiny level to use. While the decisions discussed above 
reached the constitutional review stage, it is unclear whether the 
situations they analyzed represent truly cognizable instances of 
vote dilution. 
Considering contexts outside of nonresident vote dilution 
demonstrates that there are multiple reasonable ways for legisla-
tures to create electorates. In the local sphere, governments are 
allowed to be innovative and experiment in creating municipali-
ties that are responsive to local conditions.186 In the state-level 
legislative district sphere, legislatures may be able to use differ-
ent population metrics to equalize voter populations to comply 
with one person, one vote, even after Evenwel.187 Including more 
or fewer voters in the denominator of these voter population cal-
culations does not by itself necessarily create a constitutional is-
sue absent some other problem with the district’s creation.188 A 
court faced with a nonresident vote dilution claim could therefore 
conclude that, in this sphere as well, “[t]he decision to include or 
exclude any [ ] group involves choices about the nature of repre-
sentation with which we have been shown no constitutionally 
founded reason to interfere.”189 
The benchmark issue that is so critical in the statutory vote 
dilution context is also highly relevant to nonresident vote dilu-
tion claims. In Hall, which involved a challenge to the size of a 
governing body, the Court held that “[t]here is no principled reason 
why one size should be picked over another as the benchmark for 
comparison.”190 The Court noted that sometimes this benchmark 
will be an obvious one that can easily be used to measure the di-
lutive effects of the challenged practice.191 But courts cannot 
speculate about what the ideal benchmark is: there has to be a 
 
 186 See Hadley v Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 US 50, 59 
(1970) (“We see nothing in the Constitution to prevent experimentation.”). 
 187 See Evenwel, 136 S Ct at 1123, 1132–33 (holding that states “may” draw legislative 
districts using total population and declining to resolve the question whether states may 
also use the voter-eligible population metric when doing so). 
 188 See, for example, White v Regester, 412 US 755, 765–67 (1973) (invalidating dis-
tricts drawn in a manner that invidiously discriminated based on race); Gomillion v Lightfoot, 
364 US 339, 346–47 (1960) (same). 
 189 Burns v Richardson, 384 US 73, 92 (1966). 
 190 Hall, 512 US at 881 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 191 Id (Kennedy) (plurality). See also Rodriguez v Harris County, Texas, 964 F Supp 
2d 686, 725 (SD Tex 2013) (describing how plaintiffs usually demonstrate the undiluted 
benchmark by proposing hypothetical redistricting schemes on illustrative maps). 
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“principled reason” why one alternative is chosen as the measure-
ment for the dilutive practice.192 This principled benchmark alter-
native is necessary for courts to determine whether vote dilution 
is actually occurring.193 While Hall was decided in the racial vote 
dilution context under the Voting Rights Act, its reasoning can be 
applied here as well.194 
The substantial interest test deployed by most circuits to an-
alyze these claims arguably poses this benchmark issue. Presum-
ably, if required to demonstrate an appropriate benchmark elec-
torate that would not dilute their votes, plaintiffs would argue 
that the reasonable alternative practice includes only residents of 
the relevant jurisdiction.195 But courts using the substantial in-
terest version of the rational basis test are instead considering as 
ideal electorates those that include residents plus other substan-
tially interested people. Although not using these ideal elec-
torates as benchmarks in the same way as in racial vote dilution 
cases, courts are indicating that they similarly operate as reason-
able alternatives that do not dilute votes.196 
It is not immediately clear why this kind of nonresident en-
franchisement would be the best benchmark to use, though. 
States defending against nonresident vote dilution claims might 
point to the concerns brought out by the Duncan factors to estab-
lish why including substantially interested nonresidents is appro-
priate in constructing an ideal, nondilutive district.197 They could 
also point to cases articulating the scope of the interest exception 
 
 192 Hall, 512 US at 881 (Kennedy) (plurality). See also Concerned Citizens for Equality 
v McDonald, 63 F3d 413, 418 (5th Cir 1995) (holding that the proffered language from the 
Texas state constitution was too amorphous to constitute a “readily identifiable bench-
mark”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 193 See Hall, 512 US at 880 (Kennedy) (plurality) (“The phrase vote dilution itself 
suggests a norm with respect to which the fact of dilution may be ascertained.”). 
 194 See generally, for example, Glenn P. Smith, Note, Interest Exceptions to One-Resident, 
One-Vote: Better Results from the Voting Rights Act?, 74 Tex L Rev 1153 (1996) (comparing 
various property-based and residency-based voting schemes to the Voting Rights Act vote 
dilution body of law). 
 195 See, for example, Hosford v Ray, 806 F Supp 1297, 1307–08 (SD Miss 1992) (grant-
ing resident plaintiffs their requested relief to enjoin nonresidents from voting in the rel-
evant election for superintendent of education—thus creating a district composed only of 
resident voters). 
 196 See id at 1303 (holding that, “[w]here no substantial interest exists, a practice of 
allowing municipal separate school district electors to vote for the county superintendent 
of education [ ] dilutes the vote of those residents who reside within the county, but outside 
the municipal separate school district”); Sutton v Escambia County Board of Education, 
809 F2d 770, 772 (11th Cir 1987) (stating that nonresidents without a substantial interest 
must be excluded from voting). 
 197 See Duncan, 69 F3d at 96. 
 2244  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:2213 
   
to the one person, one vote rule and the focus in such cases on 
allowing all interested voters to have a voice in elections.198 But 
resident plaintiffs could in turn point to Holt and its focus on the 
importance of residency in determining who exercises the fran-
chise in any particular election to argue that their claims are 
valid.199 Both conceptions of benchmark electorates are arguably 
reasonable ones. As in Hall, there is not necessarily any “princi-
pled reason” why one of these systems should be chosen over the 
other as the ideal nondilutive practice. Because that is the case, 
courts facing nonresident vote dilution claims can remain entirely 
uninvolved in their merits. If there is no benchmark representing 
an undiluted ideal, there is no vote dilution, and therefore plain-
tiffs do not have a cognizable claim for which the court can grant 
relief. 
If courts stay out of nonresident vote dilution claims, deci-
sions regarding the inclusion of nonresidents in an electorate will 
instead be left to the legislature’s discretion. Residents would 
therefore need to use the political process to change the composi-
tion of the relevant electorate and exclude nonresidents. The 
Supreme Court has noted that, in the context of redistricting, 
courts might need to become involved when legislators have no 
incentive to effect change.200 This could be an argument for con-
tinued judicial consideration of these claims: nonresidents might 
capture relevant decisionmakers through lobbying efforts or other-
wise frustrate attempts to disenfranchise them despite their po-
tentially minimal interest levels. 
There are two main reasons to believe that these considerations 
would not pose problems in this context. First, if the extension of 
the franchise to nonresidents involves invidious discrimination 
based on a suspect category like race, resident-plaintiffs could al-
ways bring an equal protection claim on that basis.201 Second, the 
unique circumstances in which nonresident vote dilution claims 
typically arise provide protection against legislator capture. In 
 
 198 See Cipriano, 395 US at 705–06 (invalidating a voting scheme that excluded in-
terested voters from an election of general importance). See also Salyer, 410 US at 727–30 
(using property owners’ interest as a touchstone in upholding the voting scheme in a special-
purpose district). 
 199 Holt, 439 US at 68–70. 
 200 See Evenwel, 136 S Ct at 1123 (describing how the Court initially declined to enter 
the “political thicket” of redistricting but eventually took an active role in the area). But 
see id at 1140 (Thomas concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Court has been wrong to en-
tangle itself with the political process.”). 
 201 See Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 904 (1995) (noting that the Equal Protection 
Clause’s “central mandate is racial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking”). 
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cases in which state statutes are implemented locally to create 
the problematic voting system,202 residents could lobby the state 
to change the relevant law. State legislators likely have a larger 
group of constituents beyond the nonresidents who might want to 
maintain the status quo voting scheme. Because of this disconnect 
between the contested electorate and the decisionmakers who 
could effect a change in that electorate, the possibility that these 
decisionmakers could be captured by the nonresident interest 
group is greatly reduced. In cases in which the governing docu-
ments of particular localities allow nonresident voting, residents 
most likely had a say in the decision to enfranchise nonresi-
dents.203 Having made this decision through the political process, 
allowing a vocal minority of residents to appeal to the courts to 
change it would pervert that well-functioning process. Those dis-
senters could instead appeal to their fellow residents in an effort 
to once again change the governing documents for the locality. 
Thus, leaving the decision to enfranchise nonresidents to the leg-
islature would provide adequate remedies for those residents 
seeking a change in the electorate. 
B. Nonresident Vote Dilution Claims as Residency Restrictions 
Courts should treat nonresident vote dilution claims as non-
cognizable. But some courts in the future may decide to reach 
their merits despite this. If that is the case, then the second 
threshold question—the correct standard of constitutional re-
view—is implicated. The existing split on this question can be re-
solved by considering nonresident vote dilution claims alongside 
closely related claims of nonresident disenfranchisement. 
Kramer established that any voting restriction not based on 
residency, age, or citizenship is subject to strict scrutiny.204 The 
inverse of this principle is that, when an election regulation prem-
ises the franchise on a residency requirement, challenges to that 
regulation by nonresidents are reviewed using a rational basis 
standard.205 Even when nonresidents may have some interest in 
 
 202 See, for example, Locklear, 514 F2d at 1153 & n 4 (explaining how state legislation 
created the nonresident vote dilution issue); Duncan, 69 F3d at 91 (same). 
 203 See, for example, May v Town of Mountain Village, 132 F3d 576, 582 (10th Cir 
1997) (noting that the jurisdiction’s residents specifically voted to approve the charter ex-
tending the franchise to nonresident property owners). 
 204 See Kramer, 395 US at 633. See also text accompanying notes 91–97. 
 205 See Holt, 439 US at 70. See also notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
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an election, courts typically uphold their exclusion from the fran-
chise after applying the requisite rational basis review.206 Resi-
dents generally have greater knowledge of and interest in the gov-
ernance of a particular area, thus explaining the rationality of 
these voting schemes.207 
That does not mean that the denial of the franchise to non-
residents unfailingly survives constitutional review, however. 
Holt, for example, recognized that, in “a situation in which a city 
has annexed outlying territory in all but name,” the disenfran-
chisement of those in that outlying territory would be unconstitu-
tional.208 Courts have in fact found that nonresidents’ disenfran-
chisement in those situations is unconstitutional after applying 
strict scrutiny,209 remaining alert to the possibility that this dis-
enfranchisement involves nothing more than the removal of a 
truly interested group from the voting population.210 Nonresident 
disenfranchisement claims thus turn on interest levels just as 
nonresident vote dilution cases do. Usually residency status will 
effectively divide groups of voters into those who are sufficiently 
interested members of the electorate and those who are not. When 
 
 206 See, for example, English v Board of Education of Town of Boonton, 301 F3d 69, 
79 (3d Cir 2002) (applying rational basis review and holding that nonresidents did not 
need proportional representation on a district’s school board because “the mere fact that a 
municipality’s actions may have an impact—even a substantial impact—on non-residents 
does not entitle those non-residents to vote in the municipality’s elections”); Hawkins v 
Johanns, 88 F Supp 2d 1027, 1046 (D Neb 2000) (“While one can argue whether Nebraska 
made the right choice, the relationship between the governmental purpose and the chal-
lenged statutes [excluding nonresidents from voting] is neither arbitrary nor irrational.”); 
St. Louis County, Mo v City of Town and Country, 590 F Supp 731, 738 (ED Mo 1984) 
(applying rational basis review because “[t]hose who reside outside the jurisdiction here 
do not have [a] constitutional right to vote, so a compelling state interest need not be 
shown for not allowing them to vote”). 
 207 See Broyles v Texas, 618 F Supp 2d 661, 687 (SD Tex 2009) (providing “a number 
of rational bases” for nonresidents’ exclusion from the franchise in local elections, includ-
ing their reduced knowledge of local affairs and smaller interest in the welfare of a 
jurisdiction). 
 208 Holt, 439 US at 72 n 8. 
 209 See, for example, Little Thunder, 518 F2d at 1256 (holding that strict scrutiny 
applied to a nonresident disenfranchisement claim when voters with a substantial interest 
in the election were denied the franchise). See also id (“Geographic residency requirements 
are permissible when they are designed to insure that only voters who have a substantial 
interest in the outcome of elections will participate.”) (emphasis added); Evans v Cornman, 
398 US 419, 425–26 (1970) (holding that residents of a federal enclave in Maryland needed 
the franchise in elections within the state because “[i]n nearly every election . . . appellees 
have a stake equal to that of other Maryland residents”). 
 210 See Evans, 398 US at 423, quoting Carrington v Rash, 380 US 89, 94 (1965) (“All 
too often, lack of a ‘substantial interest’ might mean no more than a different interest, and 
‘[f]encing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may 
vote is constitutionally impermissible.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
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nonresidents have an extremely strong interest in an election’s 
outcome, though, laws disenfranchising them receive higher 
scrutiny. 
Nonresident vote dilution cases can be similarly analyzed. 
Normally, residency is an appropriate limiting principle for ex-
tension of the franchise. Many of the districts in these cases there-
fore did not need to allow nonresidents to vote in their elections, 
but they did so anyway.211 In some cases, this was a state decision 
in which resident voters indirectly had a voice; in others, resi-
dents themselves decided that allowing nonresidents to vote in 
some fashion was perfectly appropriate.212 Once a state’s decision 
to extend the franchise this way is implemented, subjecting that 
franchise to strict scrutiny in every case would render its existence 
tenuous at best.213 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized 
that states need the opportunity to create reasonable election reg-
ulations.214 To then say, as the Fourth Circuit does, that every 
time a state enfranchises interested nonresidents this choice will 
face the prospect of being overruled by stringent constitutional 
review seems antithetical to the Court’s previously articulated ra-
tionale for a balancing test in the voting rights context.215 
As noted in Part II, though, an analysis focusing solely on the 
interests of nonresidents ignores the very problem that nonresi-
dent vote dilution claims are trying to address. Pure rational ba-
sis review would not properly account for this problem because it 
 
 211 See, for example, May, 132 F3d at 582 (noting that the jurisdiction’s residents spe-
cifically voted to approve the charter granting nonresident property owners the franchise). 
See also Locklear, 514 F2d at 1153 n 4 (noting that, while state legislation mandated the 
relevant school board election procedure, considerable local variation existed as to nonres-
ident enfranchisement under that statute). 
 212 See May, 132 F3d at 578–79; Locklear, 514 F2d at 1153 & n 4. 
 213 To say this applies to a state’s decision is to say it applies to a local government’s 
decision as well. See Avery v Midland County, 390 US 474, 480 (1968) (“The actions of local 
government are the actions of the State.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 214 See, for example, Crawford v Marion County Election Board, 553 US 181, 189–90 
(2008) (Stevens) (plurality) (reaffirming that “evenhanded” election regulations are con-
stitutional); Burdick, 504 US at 433 (“[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny 
. . . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably 
and efficiently.”); Anderson, 460 US at 788 (citing the state’s “important regulatory inter-
ests” in elections as sufficient to justify “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions”). 
 215 See Duncan, 69 F3d at 95 (rejecting Locklear’s use of strict scrutiny because it 
would leave all expansions of voter rolls vulnerable to constitutional attack). See also Note, 
93 Harv L Rev at 1502 n 77 (cited in note 6) (arguing that in the vote dilution context, 
“[s]trict scrutiny would lead to the rejection of every state electoral distribution and hence 
be unworkable”). 
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is so deferential to a state’s proffered interest.216 The “substantial 
interest” definition of rational basis deployed by most courts in 
nonresident vote dilution claims, however, does account for the 
issue.217 By explicitly considering the interests of all parties in the 
relevant election, this “substantial interest” rational basis test en-
sures that constitutional review of these claims is neither a free 
pass nor fatal in fact. The test ensures that when nonresidents 
are sufficiently interested in an election’s outcome, their enfran-
chisement does not result in problematic vote dilution, as all in-
terested voters are given a voice in the election. If plaintiffs in 
these cases can prove that their votes are severely diluted by un-
interested nonresidents, then courts can scrutinize the election 
scheme more closely. Otherwise, courts can defer to the state’s 
decision to enfranchise those with a substantial interest in the 
election’s outcome.  
The notion of what a “substantial” interest is will of course 
vary from case to case. There will be some situations in which 
nonresident interest will be substantial enough to defeat a dilu-
tion claim but would not be enough to prevail on an enfranchise-
ment claim. The cases arising in school district contexts in partic-
ular highlight this issue: more often than not, the status quo may 
be left in place using this framework.218 Still, this rational basis 
standard represents a better way for courts to review nonresident 
vote dilution claims and account for this range of interests than 
the strict scrutiny used in the Fourth Circuit. 
C. Redefining the Substantial Interest Requirement 
Deciding that the substantial interest definition of rational 
basis is the correct way to review nonresident vote dilution claims 
does not fully answer the question of what courts reaching the 
merits of these cases should do going forward. Courts confronting 
 
 216 See, for example, Crawford, 553 US at 194–96 (Stevens) (plurality) (stating that 
voter fraud prevention in Indiana provided a rational basis for requiring voter identifica-
tion at the polls despite the lack of evidence “of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana 
at any time in its history”). 
 217 See, for example, Board of County Commissioners of Shelby County, Tennessee v 
Burson, 121 F3d 244, 249 (6th Cir 1997); Hogencamp v Lee County Board of Education of 
Lee County, 722 F2d 720, 722 (11th Cir 1984); Clark v Town of Greenburgh, 436 F2d 770, 
772 (2d Cir 1971). 
 218 Compare, for example, Duncan, 69 F3d at 98 (using nonresident interest in school 
board elections as the basis for dismissing a vote dilution claim), with English, 301 F3d at 
82 (holding that nonresidents did not need to be enfranchised because “New Jersey has 
legitimate reasons for limiting the input of a [nonresident school] district in the [ ] district’s 
board’s decisions”). 
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these claims will need to engage in a fact-specific inquiry that in-
vestigates the substantiality of nonresidents’ interests and the 
burden placed on residents’ rights to undiluted votes when these 
interests are given effect.219 The Duncan factors are an imperfect 
means of engaging in this analysis, though. 
1. Tension in the current substantial interest test. 
This inquiry into the substantiality of nonresidents’ interests 
raises questions about the interests that are sufficiently substan-
tial to render nonresident enfranchisement rational. After all, “[a] 
city’s decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately 
outside its borders,”220 and so not all interests of nonresidents can 
be substantial in a constitutionally important way.221 Courts have 
typically used factors similar to those in Duncan to assess the 
substantiality of nonresidents’ interests and the rationality of al-
lowing nonresident inclusion in the franchise.222 The two factors 
that are most important to this inquiry are nonresidents’ finan-
cial interests and the level of nonresident domination over the 
election’s results.223 The financial interest factor is particularly 
strong throughout nonresident vote dilution cases224 as well as 
Supreme Court precedent in analogous circumstances.225 Even 
more dispositive in some cases is the domination factor. To the 
extent nonresidents can quantitatively overwhelm the election 
and dilute the votes of residents so much that residents can po-
tentially no longer control the election’s outcome, courts will find 
 
 219 See notes 181–82 and accompanying text. See also Durchslag, 33 Case W Res L 
Rev at 39 (cited in note 30) (arguing that “‘interest,’ implicitly or explicitly, must be the 
touchstone of the Court’s analysis” in vote dilution cases). 
 220 Holt, 439 US at 69. 
 221 See Clark, 436 F2d at 772 (“[V]oter ‘interest’ . . . will always vary from group to 
group and issue to issue, but this does not ‘dilute’ the vote of any group in the constitu-
tional sense.”). See also Southern California Rapid Transit District v Bolen, 822 P2d 875, 
886 (Cal 1992) (“Although nonproperty owning residents of the [local] districts are ‘af-
fected’ by the outcome of the referendum, they are no more affected than any other resi-
dent of the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area.”). 
 222 See notes 168–80 and accompanying text. 
 223 See notes 170, 175–78, and accompanying text. 
 224 See, for example, May, 132 F3d at 579 (finding that nonresidents had a substantial 
interest because they paid “over eight times more in property taxes than the residents”). 
But see, for example, King County Water District No 54 v King County Boundary Review 
Board, 554 P2d 1060, 1067 (Wash 1976) (“To allow the municipal franchise to all persons 
with a pecuniary interest would not permit of a manageable standard.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 225 See, for example, Salyer, 410 US at 728–29 (noting that in the water district at 
issue, landowners had costs assessed according to water benefits received, making the ex-
clusive enfranchisement of property owners rational). 
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that the election scheme is irrational despite nonresidents’ other 
interests.226 
But tension exists between these two factors. If nonresidents 
financially support a district through property taxes or otherwise, 
it is not clear why their potential control of the school board would 
be irrational. In Duncan, for example, nonresidents sent 15 per-
cent of their property tax revenue and 30 percent of the portion of 
their sales tax revenue earmarked for education to the county 
school district; this totaled 21 percent of all funds spent in the 
Rural Coffee County School District.227 These numbers are not in-
significant, and it is not irrational to conclude that these nonres-
idents should have the ability to strongly influence, or even con-
trol, the decisions of the body that they financially support. The 
Sixth Circuit instead found the scheme rational specifically be-
cause they did not have this control.228 
Another Duncan factor raises a similar conflict with the dom-
ination issue. The third factor focuses on stakeholder crossover 
between jurisdictions: more crossover favors allowing nonresi-
dents to vote. In the school context, if a significant number of non-
resident children attend another district’s schools, perhaps nonres-
idents have a large enough stake in school governance to 
numerically dominate in school board elections. With this factor, 
the ability of nonresidents to dominate an election might actually 
argue in favor of their enfranchisement. But courts largely do not 
confront this tension.229 The next Section therefore proposes an 
alternative to the Duncan factors that makes the same substan-
tial interest inquiry without this inherent disconnect. 
 
 226 See, for example, Hogencamp, 722 F2d at 721 (finding the relevant voting scheme 
unconstitutional in part because “[a]t the time of this lawsuit [nonresident] city votes had 
decided three of the last five elections for county school board”). See also Locklear, 514 F2d 
at 1156. 
 227 See Duncan, 69 F3d at 96–97. 
 228 Id at 97. 
 229 See, for example, Davis v Linville, 864 F2d 127, 129–30 (11th Cir 1989) (finding 
that the absence of nonresident domination in the superintendent election made nonresi-
dent enfranchisement rational, while also finding considerable student and tax crossover 
between jurisdictions). But see Bjornestad v Hulse, 229 Cal App 3d 1568, 1593 (1991) (not-
ing in response to the plaintiffs’ domination argument that “the overwhelming number of 
nonresident landowners also argue in favor of the recognition of their substantial interest” 
in the district) (emphasis added). 
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2. Refocusing the inquiry on the jurisdiction’s boundaries. 
Courts can reframe their substantial interest analysis in ap-
plying rational basis review to focus on the jurisdiction’s bounda-
ries. They can ask whether these boundaries arbitrarily create 
“residents” and “nonresidents” where a single political commu-
nity has been unnecessarily fragmented for purposes of the rele-
vant election.230 If such fragmentation exists, the nonresident en-
franchisement will be rational because it extends the franchise to 
other interested members of that unified community. 
Using the true contours of a political community rather than 
geographic borders to determine the composition of an electorate 
is not a new idea. The dissent in Holt argued forcefully against 
granting a “talismanic significance”231 to geography in favor of a 
focus on the “reciprocal relationship between the process of gov-
ernment and those who subject themselves to that process by 
choosing to live within the area of its authoritative application.”232 
Geographic borders still matter to this framework, as they gener-
ally circumscribe the universe of people that could be included in 
the interested political community for purposes of the relevant 
election.233 In nonresident vote dilution cases, the nonresidents 
are not an amorphous group of potentially interested observers 
that could reside anywhere else in the state: they are usually res-
idents of a defined locality associated in some way with the juris-
diction where the contested election is being held.234 But consid-
ering the political community would refocus the judicial inquiry 
to whether the specific geographic borders separating residents 
from nonresidents are irrational in the context of the specifically 
challenged election. This is not to say that the court would need 
to physically redraw the boundaries of the relevant district; in-
stead, the court would recognize that, for this purpose, the exist-
ing boundaries are inadequate. 
 
 230 For a standard focusing on arbitrariness in election laws, see, for example, Avery, 
390 US at 484 (“The Equal Protection Clause does not, of course, require that the State 
never distinguish between citizens, but only that the distinctions that are made not be 
arbitrary or invidious.”). 
 231 Holt, 439 US at 81 (Brennan dissenting). 
 232 Id at 82 (Brennan dissenting). 
 233 See Briffault, 60 U Chi L Rev at 387–88 (cited in note 6) (describing how in Holt 
the Court focused on one boundary—the corporate limits of Tuscaloosa—while ignoring 
the defined extraterritorial zone containing the disenfranchised plaintiffs). 
 234 See Duncan, 69 F3d at 91. Nonresident vote dilution cases involving enfranchise-
ment of nonresident property owners would be an exception, although even in those cases 
those enfranchised are a limited group directly connected to the jurisdiction at issue 
through property ownership. See May, 132 F3d at 578. 
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Commentators have echoed the argument that a locality’s geo-
graphic borders should be de-emphasized in considering a local 
electorate’s composition. They note that the shared sense of com-
munity that a group enjoys is sometimes more important than 
geographic boundaries in determining the contours of the fran-
chise.235 These shared interests are important, as ideally they 
would justify including all who share those values in the same 
electorate.236 This ensures that the “political community” limit is 
not underinclusive, excluding those who are outside of the geo-
graphic line but share a sufficient identity with those inside of 
that line. 
This “political community” understanding of the substantial 
interest inquiry also has support in the nonresident vote dilution 
cases. Even as courts explicitly list the same factors as those in 
Duncan, their inquiry also touches on the implication of those fac-
tors—the more closely interconnected the nonresident and resi-
dent groups are, the more likely it is that nonresidents have a 
stake in the relevant election’s outcome.237 In other contexts, courts 
have similarly recognized that districts cannot be created to fence 
out an interested portion of the population.238 As one commentator 
has noted, the process of defining a territory can be a tool through 
which states classify people “without inquiring as to why they 
should be so classified or why there are inequalities between 
 
 235 See Sanford Levinson, Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote?, 41 Fla L Rev 
545, 555–56 (1989) (“Citizenship, however, is a purely formal category. A citizen of a given 
community need not reside in it to vote [in it].”). See also Michelle Wilde Anderson, 
Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 Stan L Rev 931, 943–44 (2010) (arguing that cities 
should annex unincorporated neighborhoods that have been arbitrarily “mapped out” of 
the city, if the neighborhoods contain interested residents). 
 236 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan 
Areas, 48 Stan L Rev 1115, 1126 (1996) (describing how localities are usually assumed to 
be “groups of people with shared concerns and values, distinct from those of the surround-
ing world”). 
 237 See, for example, Cantwell v Hudnut, 566 F2d 30, 35 (7th Cir 1977) (“[A]s a result 
of the economic and social, as well as political, interrelationships between the districts . . . 
all residents of the county share a community of interests.”); Rutledge v Louisiana, 330 F 
Supp 336, 339 (WD La 1971) (noting that the parish and city school systems “clearly can-
not be characterized as ‘foreign’ or totally separate”). See also Hogencamp, 722 F2d at 722 
(citing the total independence of the school districts as the basis for excluding nonresidents 
from the relevant election). 
 238 See Holt, 439 US at 72 n 8 (noting that “a situation in which a city has annexed 
outlying territory in all but name” might receive different legal treatment); Evans, 398 US 
at 425 (“Of the other differences asserted between Maryland residents who live on federal 
enclaves and those who do not, most are far more theoretical than real.”). 
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those places.”239 That is, states may use factors, such as geogra-
phy, that are unconnected to the interests shared by groups of 
people in order to classify them into different populations. Courts 
confronted with nonresident vote dilution claims can more explic-
itly address this problem by focusing on the boundaries drawn 
between “residents” and “nonresidents.” If those labels are inap-
propriate based on the interrelationship between jurisdictions, it 
cannot be irrational to allow “nonresidents” to vote in an election 
in which they truly do have a substantial interest. 
Defining the political community without relying solely on 
geographic parameters is not a self-evident task. In many, per-
haps most, cases, the two might be coextensive. As scholars have 
noted, local boundaries are often drawn particularly because they 
circumscribe a group of interested individuals who wish to asso-
ciate with each other.240 Nonresident vote dilution cases would 
therefore arise only infrequently, when the normal process of 
boundary drawing arguably did not fully capture the communal 
membership of the area for purposes of the contested election. 
When they do arise, however, identifying the political community 
could be a difficult exercise, particularly as local governments of-
ten exercise extraterritorial authority.241 
Courts facing this situation can use the Duncan factors to 
guide this inquiry, as financial or social interrelationships pro-
vide insight into the nature of the relevant community.242 Refram-
ing the substantial interest question in this way dissipates the 
identified tension by considering the substantial interests of both 
nonresidents and residents. Currently, as the Duncan factors are 
construed, if nonresidents can dominate an election, their enfran-
chisement is irrational. But refocusing the inquiry on the nature 
of the boundaries between the two groups changes that construc-
tion. If there are only insignificant ties between the two groups 
such that they are truly separate, then nonresident domination 
in elections is irrational. Courts would therefore have to consider 
 
 239 Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Government, “One Person, One Vote,” and the Jewish 
Question, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev 1, 38 (2014). 
 240 See Briffault, 48 Stan L Rev at 1128 (cited in note 236) (“By circumscribing discrete 
bits of territory, [geographic] boundaries describe particular place-based communities.”). 
 241 See Richard Briffault, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.: Extraterrito-
riality and Local Autonomy, 86 Denver U L Rev 1311, 1323 (2009) (discussing the extra-
territorial power of local governments). 
 242 See Briffault, 48 Stan L Rev at 1126 (cited in note 236). 
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the significance to the challenged election of geographic bounda-
ries circumscribing a particular local government.243 But if the 
boundary divides a unified interested group into nonresidents 
and residents, it is irrational for purposes of creating the elec-
torate, and the “nonresident” enfranchisement is, in turn, ra-
tional. The supposed “domination” of nonresidents would merely 
represent the presence in the electorate of an interested sub-
group, and the factor would weigh in favor of nonresident enfran-
chisement. This renewed inquiry thus accounts for the burdens 
and interests of all relevant groups. 
There are two important limits to the scope of this analysis. 
First, the boundaries being considered might be irrational in re-
lation to the challenged election scheme but perfectly rational for 
other purposes and other elections.244 Therefore, courts would not 
need to change the boundaries of the jurisdiction wholesale but 
merely recognize their inapplicability to the specific election be-
ing considered. Second, and relatedly, this framework would not 
be as useful for larger-scale governmental units or across larger 
geographic areas. The local sphere, where experimentation in 
governance is encouraged,245 will be able to take these considera-
tions into account more easily. This is therefore where courts 
should focus this analysis. 
This political community framework has implications beyond 
nonresident vote dilution cases. Focusing on geographic bounda-
ries and their relationship to political communities also impli-
cates nonresident disenfranchisement cases. In Holt, for example, 
focusing on the commonalities shared between residents and non-
residents of the relevant jurisdiction might have made the claim 
more palatable for the Court. By refocusing this inquiry, nonres-
idents seeking the vote in elections could find it easier to succeed 
in their arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment considers how courts should review the equal 
protection issues raised by nonresident vote dilution claims. 
While one circuit has reviewed such claims using the more rigor-
ous strict scrutiny framework, other circuits instead use a more 
 
 243 See Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard 
Briffault, 48 Stan L Rev 1173, 1194 (1996). 
 244 See Briffault, 48 Stan L Rev at 1115 (cited in note 236) (noting that local govern-
ments “make decisions with respect to a range of public policies and services”). 
 245 See Avery, 390 US at 485. 
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deferential rational basis–like standard that asks if nonresidents 
are substantially interested in the relevant election. When these 
claims are considered in the larger framework of Supreme Court 
equal protection and voting cases, the question whether these 
claims are even cognizable becomes important. The lack of an ap-
propriate nondilutive benchmark in these cases likely means that 
courts should not even consider these claims of vote dilution. But 
if courts do reach the merits, rational basis review is the more 
appropriate default standard. Furthermore, courts should re-
frame their analysis to focus on the appropriateness of the bound-
aries separating voter communities into resident and nonresident 
groups. 
These cases are important because they explore what it 
means to be a member of a political community. Using rational 
basis review, courts must consider what it means to be substan-
tially interested in an election and, more fundamentally, what it 
means to belong to a cohesive group of voters. By focusing on the 
utility of jurisdictional borders on the local level, courts going for-
ward can expand on this notion and reframe conceptions of what 
interests are considered substantial under the Constitution. 
